In a general way, so far as they had any knowledge or feeling at all in the matter, the New Mexicans were somewhat in sympathy with the southern states as against those of the north in the questions growing out of the institution of slavery. Their commercial relations in early times had been chiefly with southern men; the army officers with whom they had come in contact later had been largely from the south; and the territorial officials appointed for the territory had been in most cases politicians of strong southern sympathies. Therefore most of the popular leaders, with the masses controlled politically by them, fancied themselves democrats, and felt no admiration for republicans and abolitionists. Yet only a few exhibited any enthusiasm in national politics, apathy being the leading characteristic, with a slight leaning on general principles to southern views.

There were no negro slaves in the territory, except a few body servants, brought in from time to time by military and other officials. Yet two other forms of slavery were prevalent; namely, that of peonage, or voluntary servitude for debt, involving no loss of civil rights, no sale or transfer of service, and no legal obligation on the part of the children of peons; and that of the practical enslavement of Indian captives, who were bought and sold, one or more serving in the family of each citizen of the wealthier class. There were few military or civil officials who did not own captive slaves, and they were found even in the service of the Indian agents. This enslavement of Indians seems to have rested alone on long custom, and not on law, except that no laws were invoked to prevent it. It was abolished by the president’s emancipation proclamation of 1865, and orders issued in consequence of that measure. The actual freeing of the servants, whose condition had been in most instances bettered by their servitude, which was in a sense largely voluntary, was probably effected very slowly, but I have no definite records.

Peonage, on the contrary, was sanctioned by territorial law, as well as by the usage of Mexican provinces. An act of 1851 regulated contracts between masters and servants, preventing the latter from quitting the former’s service while in debt; an amendment of 1853 made the regulations yet more stringent, authorizing the sheriff in certain cases to contract the debtor’s services to the highest bidder; and in 1859 an act provided for the arrest of fugitive servants, and prohibited the courts from interfering in the correction of servants by their masters, unless administered “in a cruel manner with dubs or stripes.” This system was not affected by the emancipation proclamation, not being regarded as ‘involuntary servitude;’ but it was abolished by act of congress in 1867.

The New Mexicans, as I have said, had no negro slaves, and they desired none. As Mexicans they had a strong feeling against the institution; and it was well understood, not only by the natives, but by all acquainted with the territory, that it was not a promising field for the introduction of slave labor. The organic act, however, as an enforced concession to the south, had provided that New Mexico should eventually be admitted as a slave or free state, as its people in their constitution might decide, thus permitting, in the view of all but partisan northerners, the holding of slaves under the territorial organization; at least, until congress and the courts should definitely decide the great national question of slavery in the territories. Thus, New Mexico was more or less a thorn in the flesh of northern politicians, and was often mentioned in the endless congressional debates on slavery. This, perhaps, had some reflex influence in the territory on the politicians if not on the people, and a kind of mild southern partisanship was developed. In 1857 a law was enacted, prohibiting, under penalty of fine and hard labor in the penitentiary, the residence of free negroes or mulattoes in the territory for a period exceeding thirty days. And in 1859 was passed an act “to provide for the protection of property in slaves in this territory.” It punished the enticing-away or aiding to escape of a slave, like stealing him, with imprisonment from four to ten years; prohibited the furnishing or sale of arms to slaves, and all trade with them except with the masters’ written consent; provided stringent and detailed regulations for the return of fugitive slaves, including his sale if not claimed; forbade masters giving their slaves the use of their time; permitted stripes for in­solence and disorderly conduct, and branding for crime; declared that slaves could not testify in court against free persons; prohibited and annulled all marriages between whites and blacks; forbade emancipation; required slaves to have passports when absent from their masters’ premises; and expressly provided that this law should not apply to peonage, but only to African slavery. There was no need of any such ultra-pro-slavery measure, and its enactment was brought about for political effect by a few men. In congress it brought out a resolution to annul all acts of the New Mexican legislature authorizing involuntary servitude except for crime, which passed the house, but not the senate. On the governor’s suggestion that it was too severe in some respects, however, the act was repealed in December 1861. In 1865-6 the act of 1857 against free negroes was repealed; and in 1866-7 an act was passed abolishing all involuntary servitude in the territory.

In view of the circumstances that have been noted, and of the facts that New Mexico had so recently been added by conquest to the United States, and that the territory had not received from the government at Washington the protection that bad been promised, it might naturally have been expected, as indeed it was expected by the south, that the people would favor the secession movement. But when the test came, even in the height of apparent confederate success, they did nothing of the kind, the masses favoring the union cause, and furnishing five or six thousand troops, volunteers and militia, to resist the invasion. A few prominent natives, including some branches of the Armijo family and even the delegate in congress, used their influence and money against the onion, but without avail, most of the wealthy and influential families being pronounced union men. While this sentiment of loyalty was undoubtedly real, reflecting credit on the New Mexicans, yet its fervor should not be exaggerated, apathy in national questions being a characteristic of the people; and it should be understood that their sentiment resulted largely from the fact that the confederate invasion came from Texas, the old hatred of the Texans being the strongest popular feeling of the natives, far outweighing their devotion to either the south or north.

As my readers well know, the acquisition of frontier territory by the Mexican war of 1846-8, and by the negotiations resulting in the Gadsden purchase of 1853-4, had been a southern measure. It has been often asserted by northern writers, and denied by those of the south, that the acquisition was made with a direct view to ultimate secession, and a southern confederacy of the future to stretch from ocean to ocean, and eventually to include still larger tracts of Mexican territory. Doubtless, the territory was acquired with a view to the extension of slave-state; power within the union, and it is wellnigh certain that there were men who even in the early years looked forward to a separation. I am not disposed to attach too much importance to the partisan assertions of later years, or to be overmuch indignant at the alleged iniquity of early southern plans, respecting which I have no definite opinion to offer, since these matters are beyond the field of my special research.

In 1861, however, whatever might have been the nature and scope of earlier schemes, the confederates intended to occupy all or a large portion of the territory acquired in 1846-54. This is shown by their acts, as well as by statements in such documents as are extant, though I cannot claim to have made any original research in this phase of the matter, or, indeed, to have examined all that has been made public in the voluminous war histories. It. was hoped, as is shown in another work of this series, that California, or at least southern California, would be brought by inclination and intrigue into the confederacy. It was thought that the strong southern element would be able to control Colorado. Some reliance was probably placed in the hostility of the Mormons to the government, so far as Utah was concerned. Arizona was known to be controlled by secessionists. The native New Mexicans were confidently expected to espouse the southern cause as soon as there might be a show of success. And the Apaches and Navajos were looked upon, not exactly as partisans of the south, but as a potent factor in the defeat of union forces. Troops in the territory were barely sufficient for defensive warfare against the Indians, and New Mexico was a long way from Washington, even if there had not been a need of all available forces nearer the national capital Moreover, there were military stores in the New Mexican forts worth capturing, to say nothing of the opportunity for a display of exuberant Texan patriotism, even if the Californians and Coloradans, by failing to perform their part of the contract, should render it impossible to carry out the scheme in its grander phases and extend the confederacy to the Pacific shores. The project was a grand, and from a southern point of view a legitimate, one, with good apparent prospects of success. It failed, not only because the confederate forces in general were as fully occupied in the east as were the federals, so that the enterprise had to be intrusted to the Texans alone, whose resources were limited, but because New Mexican sympathy for the south and animosity for the national government proved less potent than their union proclivities, prejudice against African slavery, and hatred of Texas; because California not only remained true to the union, but sent a column of volunteer troops to drive the rebels out of Arizona; and above all, because Colorado under energetic union management, not only was able to control the strong secession element within her borders, but to send a regiment which struck the decisive blow in ridding her southern neighbor of invaders.

My chief authorities for the subject-matter of this chapter are mentioned in a note; and it must be confessed that in respect of originality and conclusiveness on details of some phases they are less satisfactory than would be desirable, such being necessarily the case in most attempts to chronicle a minor topic of the great national struggle.

It is stated, on authority not very clearly defined, that attempts were made in the autumn of 1860 and spring of 1861 by Colonel W. H. Loring of the mounted rifles, of later fame in Egypt as Loring Pasha, temporarily in command of the department, with the aid of Colonel George B. Crittenden, commanding an expedition against the Apaches, both officers having been sent to the territory for that special purpose, to attach the New Mexican troops through the influence ot southern officers to the confederate cause; also, that this plan was defeated by the efforts of Lieutenant-colonel B. S. Roberts. However this may have been, the rank and file remained true to their allegiance, with the exception of a single soldier, and even he is not known to have joined the enemy. Many of the officers, however, made haste to espouse the confederate cause, including Loring—succeeded by Canby in the command—Crittenden, and Major H. H. Sibley. This was in June 1861; about the same time the territorial secretary, Alexander Jackson, resigned his office to go south; and the project of invasion began to assume definite shape.

Major Sibley was made brigadier-general, and ordered to Texas in July to organize and command the expedition; Ex-secretary Jackson became his assistant adjutant-general of the army of New Mexico; and the order tor the brigade to advance from San Antonio was given on November 16th. Before Sibley’s arrival, however, operations had been begun. Lieutenant-colonel John R. Baylor, second mounted rifles. C. S. A., occupied Fort Bliss on the Texas side in July, crossing into New Mexico and occupying Mesilla on the 25th. On the 1st of August he issued a proclamation as governor, taking possession in the name of the confederate states Major Isaac Lynde, of the seventh infantry, in command of the southern district of New Mexico, had a force of about 700 men at Fort Fillmore. He was a northern man. whether a traitor or a coward is not quite clear; but in a few days, perhaps on July 27th, he surrendered his whole force as prisoners of war to Baylor. A little earlier, orders had been sent to the Arizona commandants to abandon forts Buchanan and Breckenridge, which they did, destroying all property that could not be removed. On the march these garrisons heard of the surrender of Lynde, and directed their course, about 450 strong, to Fort Craig. In December Baylor’s confederate force was estimated by Canby at 800 Texans, besides 200 or 300 volunteers from the floating Mexican population of Mesilla valley.

About the middle of December General Sibley with his brigade of Texan rangers arrived, and issued his proclamations, declaring martial law and taking possession of the territory. Meanwhile, Colonel Canby was striving to organize his forces and provide means for defence. His reports show that he was greatly embarrassed by the lack of military supplies. He reported the people loyal but apathetic, and doubted the possibility of raising a sufficient force within the territory, placing but very slight reliance on the volunteers or militia. But the legislature authorized the governor to call into service the whole force of the territory to resist invasion, volunteers were rapidly enrolled, and Governor Connelly in his message congratulated the people on their patriotism, announcing that the confederates had not come north of the jornada, and that the federal force was sufficient for their expulsion. At the beginning of 1862 Canby established his headquarters at Fort Craig, where he had a force of about 4,000 men, of whom, however, 1,000 were useless militia, and less than 1,000 regular troops. Sibley, on the other hand, had about 2,500 men, Texan rangers, accustomed to Indian warfare, and good fighters.

That branch of the confederate campaign pertaining to Arizona has been recorded in another chapter of this volume, and may be briefly disposed of here. Captain Hunter with a few hundred Texans of Sibley’s army was despatched to the west, and in January or February occupied Tucson. There was no opposition, union men—if there were any such in southern Arizona—fleeing into Sonora. Hunter sent a detachment to the Pima villages on the Gila, and awaited developments in the farther west, which developments, from a Texan point of view, were most unsatisfactory. The ‘California column,’ of 1,800 federal volunteers under Colonel Carleton, advanced eastward from Fort Yuma, and the little confederate band had to retire to the Rio Grande. A captain and three men of Carleton’s advance were captured by Hunter’s men on the Gila; and on the 15th of April, in a skirmish between small parties under lieutenants Swilling and Barrett, the latter with two men was killed on the federal side, while the confederates lost one or two killed and three prisoners. In May, Tucson was occupied by the Californians. The Apaches kept the troops busy enough for a while; but in July and August they advanced to the Rio Grande, too late to aid m expelling the invaders, but in time to do much good service against the Indians in this and the following years.

In February 1862 Sibley advanced up the Rio Grande on the western side by way of Mesilla and Fort Thorn. On the 18th his army appeared before Fort Craig, and a cavalry force was sent out by Can by to defeat the apparent intention of the foe to pass to the west of the fort; but the Texans had no idea of going in that direction or of attacking the garrison. They were manoeuvring to protect their crossing of the river, which was effected at the Panadero ford, several miles below. Next day Canby sent an artillery force supported by volunteers to occupy the bluff on the eastern bank, and here on the 20th there was some firing. As in this skirmish the volunteers behaved badly, as no harm could be done to the Texans, and as the latter’s purpose was clearly to turn and not attack the position, the troops were withdrawn at night, and Major Roberts with an infantry force and two batteries was sent to occupy the upper, or Valverde, ford, some seven miles above. The confederates on the other side made for the same point; and at the ford a fight occurred early on the 21st, in which Roberts had the advantage, crossing the river, posting his batteries, and repulsing the confederate advance. Canby arrived on the field soon after noon, and an advance was ordered, the batteries were pushed forward, and fire was opened. One division of the Texans charged Hall’s battery and was repulsed; but the movement was apparently intended as a feint to draw off supporting troops from the other battery. This latter was then attacked most furiously by 1,000 Texans; the struggle was desperate; Captain McRae was killed on his guns, and his gunners were wellnigh annihilated; the supporting troops acted very badly; the guns were lost; and Canby’s army was driven in some disorder across the river to retire to the fort, leaving the northern route open to the foe.

This fight of Valverde, as it is known, reflected little credit on the federal arms. Many individuals and a few companies fought bravely, but such is the discrepancy of testimony that I make no attempt to point out cases of bravery or cowardice, blunders or wise management. The Texans, though victorious, lost probably more than the federals, whose loss was about 90 killed and mortally wounded and 100 wounded. The confederates marched on up the river without opposition to Alburquerque, leaving their sick and wounded at Socorro. We have no details respecting Sibley’s movements in these days, or those of a detachment sent to occupy Santa Fe, which was apparently accomplished without resistance.

The main force directed its march toward Fort Union, where there were stores worth about $300,000, and where Major Donaldson arrived on the 10th of March with a train of 120 wagons from Alburquerque, where he had destroyed such federal stores as could not be removed. The Texan advance under Major W. R. Scurry reached Apache Canon on the 25th. The garrison at the fort was entirely inadequate for its defence; but aid had most opportunely arrived from the north.

Colorado’s experience in the civil war has been elsewhere recorded in the volume devoted to that territory. Here it must suffice to state that by the energetic efforts of Governor Gilpin and his associates a union force was raised, which not only defeated all confederate hopes at home, but was also able to go abroad and turn the scale in New Mexico. Two companies, which later became A and B of the second Colorado volunteers, were mustered in December 1861, going to New Mexico in January 1862. Company B, Captain T. H. Dodd, served under Canby at Valverde, as we have seen; and Company A, Captain J. H. Ford, remained at Fort Union. The first regiment of Colorado volunteers was commanded by Colonel J. P. Slough, S. F. Tappan being lieutenant-colonel, and J. M. Chivington major. The regiment was composed largely of ‘Pike’s Peakers,’ the best of fighting material, intensely loyal to the union, always eager to go to the front, but not taking kindly to the restraints of military discipline when there was no fighting to be done. Whole companies were often under arrest for mutiny; and an order to march to the relief of Canby—obtained by Major Chivington from General Hunter mainly with a view to prevent the disintegration of the regiment—was welcome to all. The troops left Denver in February; the different divisions united March 7th at the foot of the Raton Pass; a march of 64 miles was once made in 24 hours, and the regiment arrived at Fort Union on the 11-13th of March. Major G. R. Paul, colonel of New Mexico volunteers, was in command of the post, but was ranked by Colonel Slough, who assumed command of the united forces.

On March 22d Colonel Slough’s army of 1,342 men, including 300 regular troops, marched from Fort Union toward Santa Fé, encamping at Bernal Spring on the 24th. On the 25th the advance of 400 men, half of them mounted, encamped near the old Pecos ruins; and a scouting party under Lieutenant Nelson captured four men of the enemy’s picket, five miles farther west at Pigeon’s rancho. Next morning Major Chivington advanced with all his force, and about a mile beyond the rancho, at the mouth of the Apache Canyon proper, found a Texan battery posted, which opened fire. This was about 2 p.m. The federal infantry, deployed to the canon slopes as skirmishers, advanced to the attack, the cavalry remaining behind a spur in the ravine, with orders to charge when the battery showed signs of retreating. The battery presently fell back a mile or more, but Captain Howland failed to charge as ordered. The new position of the Texan guns was at a bend in the canyon, across a dry arroyo-bed, supported by the infantry, strongly posted among the rocks and on the summits. Chivington repeated his former manoeuvre, but dismounting Howland’s and Lord’s men to strengthen the infantry on the flanks, he left the cavalry charge to 100 Colorado horsemen under Captain Cook. After a sharp fight on the flanks the battery yielded, and Cook dashed forward, his horsemen leaping the arroyo with a yell, and charging through and through the enemy’s ranks. Cook fell, severely wounded, but Lieutenant Nelson took his place. The infantry, under captains Downing and Wyncoop, cooperated most effectively; the Texans were driven from the field, and the fight of Apache Canon was won. Statements of casualties are conflicting; but the federals seem to have lost from five to fifteen killed, and the confederates from 20 to 40, with nearly 100 prisoners. Chivington before night fell back to Pigeon’s rancho to bury his dead, care for the wounded, and send back the prisoners, with a message to Colonel Slough and the main army. That night or the next morning he retired four or five miles farther, to Kolosky’s rancho, where the water supply was better; and here he was joined by Slough and his troops in the night of the 27th.

On March 28th Slough pushed forward with his full force; but Chivington, with 400 or 500 men under the guidance of Lieutenant-colonel Manuel Chavez, was detached to cross the mountains and attack the enemy’s rear. His success will be noted presently. The rest of the army, 700 or 800 strong, met the Texans, sooner than Slough expected, half a mile beyond Pigeon’s rancho, about 9 A. M. From the first the federals were outnumbered, acted on the defensive, and though fighting bravely for about five hours, were forced back to the rancho, to a new position half a mile farther east, and finally to Kolosky’s. Had the enemy known the number of the troops opposed to them, or had they not been somewhat over­cautious as a result of the former battle, the federal repulse might have been a disastrous defeat. The federal loss is given as from 20 to 50 killed, 40 to 80 wounded, and 15 to 20 prisoners; that of the confederates 36 to 150 killed, 60 to 200 wounded, and 100 prisoners, the last figure apparently, however, including both battles. Scurry, the Texan commander, instead of following up his success, sent a flag of truce, asking an armistice for the purpose of burying his dead, and caring for his wounded This was granted by Slough, and the Texans took advantage of the opportunity to fall back to Santa Fé, which position they presently abandoned and retreated down the Rio Grande.

The cause of Sibley’s retreat, notwithstanding his apparent victory, must be sought in the operations of Chivington. This officer, on the 28th, with 370 Colorado volunteers and 120 regulars, had been guided by Chavez over the mountains to the rear of the enemy, where they arrived about noon. Descending the precipitous cliffs in single file, they drove off the Texan guard, capturing several of their number, spiked the cannon, killed the mules, burned 64 waggons, and destroyed all the enemy’s supplies, thus rendering it impossible for the confederates to continue their offensive operations. This virtually ended the campaign; the ‘Pike’s Peakers’ had proved more than a match for the ‘Texan rangers’, saving New Mexico for the union; and Chivington, presiding elder of the methodist church in Colorado, had made himself the hero of the war.

Orders now came from Canby to Slough to protect Fort Union at all hazards; and, very much against the wishes of the Coloradans, the army fell back to the fort, arriving on the 2d of April. On the 5th, under new orders, the army marched for the south, under the command of Colonel Paul, Slough having resigned his commission. Galisteo was reached on the 10th, details of movements in these days having very slight significance, and here was met an adjutant from Canby. This officer, leaving Fort Craig garrisoned by volunteers under Carson, had marched northward on April 1st with 860 regulars and 350 volunteers. The confederates, or a part of them, had fallen back on Alburquerque; and against this town, on the 8th, Canby’s troops made a demonstration, with but slight effect, thence turning to the right, and joining Paul’s force at Tijeras on the 13th. The next day, Chivington having been appointed colonel of the Colorado regiment, the united army marched to the Rio Grande, and down that river to Peralta, where the confederates were posted in the adobe town, having abandoned Alburquerque. It was to some extent a surprise, and a row pickets were captured. Chivington was eager to take the town by assault, but Canby would not permit it.

On the 15th a belated Texan train coming in sight from Alburquerque was captured by 30 mounted Coloradans, who lost one man and killed four, taking one gun, a dozen prisoners, 70 mules, and 15 horses. Presently the confederates opened fibre with their artillery, which was answered, the firing being continued to some extent all day, with but slight and unrecorded effect. The Colorado troops retired to the river, and planned an attack under cover of the banks, but Canby forbade the movement. He is accused of an unwillingness to kill his old comrades, of jealousy toward the volunteers, and even of cowardice. Hayes, however, states that the reason for inaction was that he “had no desire to capture men whom he could not feed.” The Texans took advantage of a tempestuous night to ford the river and escape. On the 16th and 17th the armies advanced slowly southward in sight of each other on opposite sides of the river, the Texans burning some of their baggage on the way, to La Joya; but on the 18th the confederates had disappeared, to be seen no more, leaving, however, some of their sick and disabled, with a few wagons, which were found by Captain Grayden on a trip to the western side. A day or two later Sibley destroyed the rest of his baggage, and followed a trail over the mountains far to the west of Fort Craig, and thence to the Mesilla valley and to Fort Bliss, where he arrived early in May. In killed, wounded, prisoners, and stragglers, they had left nearly half their original force in New Mexico.

The federals advanced much at their leisure in three columns under Paul, Chivington, and Captain Morris, crossing the river at Limitar, just above Socorro, on the 20th, and there learning definitely of the enemy’s flight. On the 22d they reached the old battlefield of Valverde, where the volunteers encamped, and the regulars took up their quarters at Fort Craig. There was no thought of further pursuit, General Canby returning to Santa Fé, and leaving Colonel Chivington in command of the southern district, which position he held until succeeded by Colonel Howe. Some Texan rangers still remained in the Mesilla valley, and in May a party of them appeared at the Panadero, below the fort, but there was no fighting. On July 4th the Californian advance reached the Rio Grande, and two days later the last of the invaders left the territory. It does not seem necessary to record the movements of the Colorado companies in garrison at different posts and in a few Indian expeditions during the following months. Before the end of the year the last of them had left New Mexico for home and other service, their places being taken by the California volunteers, and General Carleton assuming command of the department in September.

The legislature at the session of 1862-3 passed resolutions thanking “the brave California and Colorado troops for their timely aid in driving the traitors and rebels from our soil,” with an additional paragraph especially complimentary to General Carleton and the Californians, whose march across the desert was regarded as “one of the most remarkable achievements of the age.” This paragraph brought out a letter from Governor Evans of Colorado, who, in view of the fact that the Californians had not arrived until the campaign was over, complained of injustice done to the Coloradans, who had really expelled the invader. Accordingly, at the next session, the legislature attempted to set the matter right, affirming, in a resolution respecting the Colorado troops, that “it is not the intention to place these brave soldiers second to none”.